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Grant Award View - GA64733-V1
Optimal policy and mechanism design in education and labour markets
GA ID:
GA64733-V1
Agency:
Australian Research Council
Approval Date:
4-Dec-2019
Variation Publish Date:
23-Jun-2020
Variation Date:
15-Dec-2020
Category:
Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences (HASS) Research
Grant Term:
15-Dec-2020 to 14-Dec-2023
Value (AUD):
$416,154.00
(GST inclusive where applicable)
Varies:
GA64733
- Optimal policy and mechanism design in education and labour markets
One-off/Ad hoc:
No
Aggregate Grant Award:
No
PBS Program Name:
ARC 19/20 Discovery
Grant Program:
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award
Grant Activity:
Optimal policy and mechanism design in education and labour markets
Purpose:
This project aims to investigate the optimal design and efficiency implications of education and labour market policies such as differential treatment in school assignment, university admissions, hiring and promotions within organisations. The project expects to develop novel theoretical models of public policy using techniques from information economics and mechanism design. The expected outcomes of this project include an enhanced capacity to design policies and a new conceptual framework to assess their efficiency. This should enable policymakers and organisations to implement more efficient policies, and inform public debates on the merits of preferential treatment, gender equity policies and other education and labour market policies.
GO ID:
GO Title:
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award for funding commencing in 2020
Internal Reference ID:
DE20 Round 1
Selection Process:
Targeted or Restricted Competitive
Confidentiality - Contract:
No
Confidentiality - Outputs:
No
Grant Recipient Details
Recipient Name:
University of Technology Sydney
Recipient ABN:
77 257 686 961
Grant Recipient Location
Suburb:
ULTIMO
Town/City:
ULTIMO
Postcode:
2007
State/Territory:
NSW
Country:
AUSTRALIA
Grant Delivery Location
State/Territory:
NSW
Postcode:
2007
Country:
AUSTRALIA